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COMMENTS
A DRUG ADDICT'S RIGHT TO ANONYMITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The enormity of the drug abuse problem and its effects upon addict-
victims and society are well known. It has been estimated that there are
more than 600,000 drug addicts in this country.' Initially, the drug prob-
lem was considered the concern of law enforcement, a belief still embraced
by many. 2 Society "attacked addiction with police and prisons, rather than
with doctors and medical treatment,"8 beginning with the passage of the
Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914,4 a tax law. Many others, however, in-
cluding some medical experts, public service attorneys, and lawmakers,
believe that because drug addiction is a disease, it is more appropriate to
attack the drug problem through medical methods.5
The medical approach has been implemented through treatment at
specialized clinics or special hospital wards. Treatment methods include
1. Cimino, Doud, Andima & West, Narcotic Addiction in the United States:
A Nationwide Survey, 2 CONTEMP. DRUG 401 (1973); Hess, van der Voort, Rickey &
Rose, Nature and Trends of Drug Use and Abuse, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 637, 637-43
(1974); McNamara & Starr, Confidentiality of Narcotic Addict Treatment Records:
A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 1578, 1580-81 (1973).
It is impossible to accumulate accurate statistics on the extent of drug abuse,
because drug traffic is an underground activity. Nevertheless, heroin use in this
country is thought to be of epidemic proportions. Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 23,
1975, at 1, col. 1.
2. E.g., McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1581-83.
3. Id. at 1581.
4. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, §§ 1-12, 38 Stat. 785, repealed, Act of Oct. 27,
1970, PUB. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(b) (3) (A), 84 Stat. 1292. This act taxed narcotics
and regulated their importation, sale, and use. It also provided that one convicted for
violation of or failure to comply with the act should "be fined not more than $2,000
or be imprisoned not more than five years, or both, in the discretion of the court." Act
of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 9, 38 Stat. 789. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. III,
1973) now regulates the importation, sale, and use of narcotics.
5. McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1583. In Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a California
statute which made the status of narcotic addiction itself a criminal offense punish-
able by imprisonment, inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment, because it was uncon-
stitutional to punish one for having the disease of drug addiction. Id. at 667.
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"cold turkey," methadone detoxification, 7 and methadone maintenance. 8
Although enrollment in a treatment program as an alternative to incar-
ceration can be voluntary or compulsory, the success of each program re-
quires the patient's effort and cooperation. As a result, program directors
must be able to assure prospective and current patients that their anonymity
and the confidentiality of their program records will be protected against
disclosure to law enforcement officers, potential employers, or any other
individual or group unless the patient consents to their release.9 That such
assurances are crucial to the operation of the programs was recognized by
the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) 1°
when it stated:
There is clear agreement among drug abuse treatment program op-
erators that their ability to assure patients and prospective patients
of anonymity is essential to the success of their programs."
In light of the importance of these considerations, this Comment will
analyze the issue of confidentiality as it relates to the drug addict in a
treatment program. Specifically, this Comment will identify the threats to
confidentiality and discuss the possible alternatives for protecting it. For
this purpose, the discussion has been divided into three parts: threats to
confidentiality, with an emphasis upon representative state reporting stat-
utes and a description of the Client Oriented Data Acquisition Process
6. In a "cold turkey" program, an addict is denied all access to the narcotic
and consequently must endure the severe physical and psychological pains of with-
drawal. For a discussion of withdrawal symptoms, see Wenk, Methadone Detoxifi-
cation in Prison: A Case Study of Philadelphia, in DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADDICT
211-14 (L. Simmons & M. Gold eds. 1973).
7. In a methadone detoxification program, a heroin addict is given methadone
in increasingly smaller doses in order to eliminate his dependency upon all drugs
after a certain period of time.
8. In a methadone maintenance program, the heroin addict is supplied indefinitely
with methadone at sufficient doses to prevent withdrawal although he does become
addicted to methadone.
9. Disclosure of an addict's identity could have a detrimental effect upon his
employment opportunities, which are not numerous in any event. If employers knew
or could determine that an individual was an addict, it is unlikely that he would be
hired or retained as an employee. See generally Feingold, Employment Problems of
the Ex-Addict: A Case Study of New York, in DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADDICT,
supra note 6, at 81.
10. SAODAP was created by executive order to utilize the resources of the
federal government to combat drug abuse. Exec. Order No. 11,599, 3 C.F.R. 301
(1971), 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. I1, 1973). Congress formalized SAODAP in 1972.
Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, §§ 201-14, 86
Stat. 67-70 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1111-23 (Supp. In, 1973)).
11. 37 Fed. Reg. 24636 (1972). See Stern, Confidentiality: Treatment and Dis-
closure, in DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADDICT, supra note 6, at 193. Both research and
treatment would be impeded without confidentiality. Research would be impaired by
the reluctance of addicts to supply information necessary to the experiment or survey.
Treatment would be affected because addicts would fear that enrollment in treatment
programs would lead to police harassment and legal action against them. McNamara
& Starr, supra note 1, at 1584-87. 2
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(CODAP) ;12 federal laws and regulations intended to insure confidenti-
ality, including an analysis of proposed federal regulations; and legal bases
upon which to premise an addict's right to confidentiality.
II. THREATS TO CONFIDENTIALITY
There are three basic threats to addict confidentiality: overzealous law
enforcement; state reporting statutes; and centralized recordkeeping proc-
esses. 13 The pervasiveness of police harassment of drug addicts and
physicians who treat them, and official intrusions into treatment centers
have made some doctors reluctant to treat drug addicts.' 4 The existence
of such "overzealous enforcement" and its inhibitory effect is well docu-
mented.' 5 Further discussion of this threat to addict confidentiality, there-
fore, is outside the scope of this Comment.
A. State Reporting Statutes
In contrast to the comprehensive documentation of the threat posed
by law enforcement officials, there has been little analysis of state reporting
statutes. Such statutes generally require physicians to file reports with
designated health or law enforcement agencies after they treat or examine
addicts.' 6 This Comment will examine four reporting statutes in particular,
those of California, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.'
7
12. CODAP, a centralized national computer recordkeeping system, is discussed
at notes 54-75 and accompanying text infra.
13. McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1587-96, discussed these threats and
presented a statistical analysis of them. Questionnaires were mailed to 974 drug
centers located throughout the country. One hundred seventy-two centers representing
all parts of the country and utilizing the full range of treatment methods responded.
The statistical survey was based upon these responses. Id. at 1579 n.1.
14. See id. at 1587-90, where the authors list statistics and individual instances
where law enforcement has interfered with the medical approach to the drug problem.
15. Id. at 1587-90.
16. According to McNamara and Starr, 15 states have enacted reporting statutes.
Id. at 1590 n.49. It should be noted that Pennsylvania has since repealed that report-
ing statute. The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, § 43, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-143 (Supp. 1974), repealing the Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act, § 8 [1961] P.L. 1664.
17. The California statute was selected because California has been considered
a center of drug traffic. The New York statute was chosen, not only for the same
reason, but also because People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 397, 298 N.E.2d 651, 345
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974), a significant case for the
issues discussed in this Comment, arose in this jurisdiction. For a discussion of this
case, see notes 100-11 and accompanying text infra. Finally, the Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania statutes were picked primarily for their attempts to ensure confidentiality
and because these states rejected the original proposal for the Centralized Record
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1. Califdrnia
The California Uniform Controlled Substances Act' requires every
physician who prescribes, furnishes, or administers a narcotic drug in the
treatment of an addict for addiction to report to the Attorney General of
California the name and address of the patient and the name and quantities
of the narcotic substance used.19 Unfortunately, the California law does
not provide for the confidentiality of these reports and in no way protects
addict anonymity.
As a result, physicians and addicts, in Blinder v. State,20 challenged
the constitutiorality of the statute upon' several grounds.2 ' The primary
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974). The
Uniform Controlled Substances Act has been enacted in 43 jurisdictions, including
Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 94C, §§ 1-48 (1972); New York, N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-96 (McKinney Supp. 1974); and Pennsylvania, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-101 to -144 (1974 Supp.).
19. Section 11221 of the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act (the
California Act) provides:
The physician prescribing, furnishing, or administering any narcotic controlled
substance in the treatment of an addict for addiction shall within five days after
the first treatment report by registered mail, over his signature, to the Attorney
General stating the name and address of the patient, and the name and quantities
of narcotic controlled substance prescribed.
The report shall state the progress of the patient under treatment.
The physician shall in the same manner further report on the 15th day of
the treatment and on the 30th day of the treatment, and thereafter shall make
such further reports as is required by the Attorney General.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11221 (West Supp. 1974).
Section 11230 of the California Act states:
A physician prescribing or furnishing a controlled substance classified in
Schedule II [including methadone] to an habitual user shall within five days
after first prescribing or furnishing the controlled substance personally report
in writing by registered mail, over his signature, to the Attorney General.
The report shall contain all of the following:
(a) Name of the patient.
(b) Address of the patient.
(c) Character of the injury or ailment.
(d) Quantity and kind of controlled substance used.
(e) A statement as to whether or not the patient is an addict.
Id. § 11230.
20. 25 Cal. App. 3d 174, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1972).
21. The plaintiffs attacked the statute as it existed prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Since all of the sections of the prior law were
reenacted into the present California Act, the current citations will be noted, with the
former citations to the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE (West 1964) appearing in
parentheses.
The physicians and addicts in Blinder challenged section 11217 of the Cali-
fornia Act (formerly section 11391), which lists the only places in which an addict
may be treated for addiction, section 11219 (formerly section 11392), which imposes
maximum daily amounts of narcotics that may be dispensed for treatment during the
first 15 days of medical attention, section 11219 (formerly section 11393), which
imposes maximum daily amounts after the first 15 days of treatment, section 11220
(formerly section 11394), which limits the durations of treatment to 30 days, and
section 11221 (formerly section 11395), which is the reporting statute (see note 19
supra). 25 Cal. App. 3d at 177, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
The plaintiff-physicians argued that sections 11217-20 of the California Act
(formerly sections 11391-94) deprived them of the right to practice medicine without
COMMENTS
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contention was that the statute infringed upon the addict's fifth amend-
ment right against compulsory self-incrimination because it compelled
addicts to be witnesses against themselves in that, when seeking treatment
for addiction, the addicts were forced to expose themselves to the "real and
appreciable risk of being identified as habitual users of narcotics which
in turn [could] result in criminal prosecution."-' The court reasoned
that the plaintiffs could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
only if they could show that the compelled disclosures would, in them-
selves, substantially threaten the fifth amendment right. Surveying the
case law, the Blinder court stated:
The cases in which reporting procedures were found to be invalid
because they violated the privilege against self-incrimination are those
in which- the disclosures condemned were "extracted from a 'highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities' and the priv-
ilege was applied only in 'an area permeated with criminal statutes' -
not 'an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry.'"24
Thus, the statute was held valid because it operated in a noncriminal, regu-
latory area of inquiry and was not directed toward a highly "selective"
group suspected of criminal activities.
25
The soundness of this conclusion, however, is itself suspect, upon two
grounds. First, while it is true that the statute was regulatory in nature,
due process of law. Id. at 179, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that rather than prohibiting physicians from practicing medicine, the
law merely limited the practice, and concluded that such a limitation was a reasonable
exercise of the police power. Id. at 180-81, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Based upon the
belief that use of methadone for treatment of addicts was unlawful under section 11374
(formerly section 11716), the physicians also contended that section 11211 (formerly
section 11391), by requiring them to report their unlawful use of methadone for treat-
ment compelled them to be witnesses against themselves. In response, the court stated
that the use of methadone was not unlawful; and, therefore, the reporting statute did
not require the physicians to report criminal activity. Id. at 186, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
The plaintiff-addicts argued that sections 11217-20 (formerly sections 11391-
94) deprived them of their right to proper medical treatment without due process of
law. Id. at 179, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The court assumed arguendo that a right to
medical treatment existed which precluded the state from making unavailable a safe
and effective drug that was essential to an individual's health and well-being, but
rejected the due process argument upon the basis that the statute, in merely regulating
the dispensing of the drug, was a reasonable use of the police power. Id. at 182-83,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41. The plaintiff-addicts further argued that the statutes denied
them equal protection of the laws in that they limited the use of methadone for treat-
ment of addiction but permitted unlimited use of methadone for treatment of other
diseases. Id. at 184, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 642. The court dismissed this argument because
the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts demonstrating that the statute was palpably
arbitrary. Id. at 185, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 642. Finally, the addicts alleged that the
statutory scheme inflicted cruel and unusual punishment, an argument that the Blinder
court rejected because the statute, while regulating the dispensing of methadone, did
not totally deprive an addict of the substance for treatment. Id. at 185-86, 101 Cal.
Rptr. at 642-43.
22. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 186, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 187, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 644, quoting California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,
430 (1971), quoting Albertson v. SCAB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
25. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 187, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
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the policy behind requiring disclosure Was not merely regulatory. The
state may have had a need to know the number of drug addicts within its
borders for purposes of allocating resources to'combat drug abuse, but
requiring disclosure of the actual identity of addicts was not necessary to
serve that end.26 Rather, disclosure of addict identity merely provided law
enforcement officials with information enabling them to monitor the ac-
tivities of addicts. Second, contrary to the court's..conclusion, drug addicts
do indeed constitute a highly selective group. inherently suspected of crim-
inal activity. Because addicts frequently resort to crime to support their
habits, the addict is often monitored for the purpose of apprehending him
in committing a crime. The unfortunate result df the court's finding is
more far-reaching than its mere provision of the law with a conceptual
error: if addicts know or suspect that enrollment in a treatment program
will supply law enforcement officers With a source of information about
them, addicts will become. suspicious of. treatment, programs and will be
reluctant to seek treatment. Thus, in finding addicts a non-suspect group
and the area regulatory rather than criminal, the Blinder court declined to
fashion a rule that might have encouraged addicts to enroll in treatment
programs. The privilege against self-incrimination, should have been ap-
plied to invalidate the California reporting statute-. Nevertheless, as it now
stands, in California, the reporting statute requires disclosure of the identity
of addicts under treatment without ensuring confidentiality. 27
2. Massachusetts
The statutory scheme in Massachusetts differs significantly from that
in California. The statute applies to both physiciais28 and treatment .facil-
ities. 29 In Massachusetts, although thete is no requirement that physicians
report the name of addict patients, the statutO does require a report of
certain identifying information.
0
26. The argument can be made that the addict's actual identity is necessary to
protect the integrity of statistical. surveys, because such knowledge precludes the
pbssibility that a single addict will be counted -more thain once. *Other methods, how-
ever, are available to protect the integrity of a statistical analysis, such as a system
of unique identifiers which could not be translated into the' actual identity of the client
by anyone. other than the treatment facility.
27' 'Even the evidentiary physician-patient privilege cannot effectively protect
confidentiality in California, because it does not apply ih criminal proceedings. CAL.
EvID. CODE § 998 (West 1966). See notes 138-43and accompanying text infra.
28. Various provisions of the Massachusetts version of the Uniform Controlled
Substance Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. 'cli. 94C, §§ 1-48 (1972), as amended, (Supp.
1974), apply to physicians.
29. Id. ch. 123, § 44 (Supp. 1974).
30. Section 24(a) of the Massachusetts Uniform Controlled Substance Act (the
Massachusetts Act) provides:
A practitioner, who dispenses 'a controlled 'substance . . [including metha-
done] . . .for the purpose of treating for his'dtu'dependency a drug dependent
'person ... shall report to the cominissione 'of mental health or his designee iden-
tifying information and the, address of each . . . patient to whom such c6ntrolle4l
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However, the statute does attempt to protect the addict's confiden-
tiality by denying law enforce.ment officials access to such information and
by prohibiting its use in acriminal prosecution.31
With respect to addicts enrolled in treatment facilities, the Massachu-
setts statute provides:
Each facility shall file with the division from time to time, on
request, such data','statistics, schedules or information as the division
may reasonably require for the purposes of this section . . . . 2
It should be noted that there is n6 requirement that specific names of
individual clients be disclosed, and, significantly, that another section states:
The administrator of each facility shall keep a record of the
treatment afforded each patient, which shall be confidential and shall
only be made available upon judicial order, whether in connection with
pending judicial proceedings or otherwise. .... 33
Hence, patients of treatment facilities are not afforded as much pro-
tection as patients of private practitioners because the information may be
disclosed upon court order.3 4 While the Massachusetts provisions are
superior from the addict's point of view to those of California, they fail
to provide the degree of protection that would enable a treatment facility to
assure the client that facility records would be kept absolutely confidential.
3. New York
Similarly, the New York State Controlled Substances Act 35 (New
York Act) places addict confidentiality in jeopardy. According to the New
York Act, by the tenth day of each month, a person certified to conduct a
maintenance program must report to the state the name and address of
each applicant awaiting admission and each applicant who has been ad-
of the substance so dispensed. Said commissioner shall maintain records of
each such report.
Id. ch. 94C, § 24(a) (1972),
31. Section 24(b) of the Massachusetts Act states:
Such records maintained by the commissioner of mental health shall be closed
to the public and shall not be available to any law enforcement official for any
purpose, nor shall they be used in the criminal prosecution of such research sub-
ject or patient pursuant to any provision of this chapter, nor shall they be admis-
sible in evidence against such research subject or patient in any criminal proceeding.
Id. § 24(b).
32. Id. ch. 123, § 44 (Supp. 1974).
33. Id. § 55(a).
34. The relationship between the two statutes is unclear. If most treatment
program operators are physicians,, it is arguable that the statute requiring disclosure
.of the confidential information upon court order is inoperative because it would require
the physician to violate the statute which precludes disclosure. However, this issue
has not been litigated.
35. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-96 (McKinney, Supp. 1974).
[VOL. 20
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mitted into the program.36 Confidentiality of facility records is mandated
by the statute, as it is in Massachusetts, unless the disclosure is compelled
by court orderY7 However, New York expressly permits use of the treat-
ment program information in a criminal investigation or proceeding.35
The New York scheme also imposes duties, upon private practi-;
tioners. Like the California law, each attending practitioner must report
to the state commissioner the name and address of any person determined
to be a narcotic addict,39 with the important distinction that the information
must be "kept confidential and may be utilized .. nly for statistical, epi-
demiological or research purposes .... ,,40
Thus, the New York scheme is more onerQu ' on the addict than that
of Massachusetts, because it requires disclosure io. the names of treatment
clients. Some protection to the addict'is provided, -however, for like the
Massachusetts provision relating to treatment4facilities, confidentiality is
required except when disclosure is compelled by court order.
36. Id. § 3355. The state, under the statute, was t0 'establish a central registry
to assemble the information including the name and other identifying information
regarding the addict. That information would be: available only to a practitioner
attempting to ascertain the status of an addict seeking treatment or admission to a
treatment program, or to a government department authorized to gather such informa-
tion. Id. § 3356.
37. Id. § 3371(1) (b).
38. Id. §3371(1)(c).
39. Id. § 3322(1). This section was challenged in Roe v. Ingram, 364 F. Supp.
536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Ingram, patients who were giveft controlled substances
listed in Schedule II of the New York Act to relieve pain complained that the statu-
tory requirement that the treating physician report their names to the state violated
their rights to privacy and sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the law. In deciding that there was no demonstration by the plaintiffs of a prob-
ability of success upon the merits sufficient to compel the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the court stated that, at present, the constitutional doctrine of the right to
privacy did not extend to this type of case. Id. at 546, Moreover, even if the doctrine
were extended, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the competing state interests
weie' insufficient to overcome their injury. Id. at 546.' See notes 168-88 and accom-
panying text infra for a discussion of the right to privacy as a legal basis for an
addict's right to anonymity.
It should be noted that the reporting required in New York is not effectively
limited by the evidentiary physician-patient privilege, because the statute provides:
For the purposes of duties arising out of this article; no communication made
to a practitioner shall be deemed confidential within the meaning of the civil prac-
tice law and rules relating to 'confidential communications between such prac-
titioner and patient.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTHa LAW § 3373 (McKinney Supp. 1974). See notes 137-67 and
accompanying text infra for a discussiontof the physician-patient privilege as a basis
for an addict's right to anonymity.
40. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3372 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The relationship
between sections 3371 and 3372 is nowhere made clear. Thus, whether a physician who
operates a treatment facility can be compelled by court order to disclose confidential
information to be used for other than statistical, epidemiological, or research purposes
is unknown. 8




Pennsylvania law'furnishes an -additional method of supervision over
the dispensation of controlled :substances. There is no actual reporting
statute, but section 12 of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act 41 (Controlled Substance Act) provides that records be
maintained concerning :what substances were distributed and the names
and addresses of the patients involved.42 Significantly, the Pennsylvania,
legislature seemed particularly sensitive to the confidentiality issue in
enacting the Controlled Substance -Act, because section 37(c) provides:
A practitioner engaged in medical practice or clinical research is
not required nor may he be compelled to furnish the name or identity
of a patient or reseaich subject to the secretary, nor -may he be com-
pelled in any State or local civil,: criminal, administrative, legislative or
other proceedings to furnish the name or identity of such an individual.
43
Another Pennsylvania 'statute also requires the gathering of information
about addicts who may be treated. Unlike the Controlled Substance Act,
which seeks to regulate the distribution of certain drugs, the Pennsylvania
Drug and Alcohol Abuse Act 44 '(Drug and Alcohol Act) was intended to
implement "a comprehensive health, education and rehabilitation program
Tor the prevention and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse and dependence,"
by establishing a Governor's Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse (Gov-
ernor's Council) to coordinate such a program. 45 Section 8(a) directs that
certain data be compiled in order to develop case' histories of patients
treated in programs developed pursuant to the Drug and Alcohol Act ;46
section 4 permits the Governor's Council to :obtain, information and publish
statistics pertaining to drug and alcohol abuse.4 7 However, elaborate pre-
cautions are provided to insure confidentiality and addict anonymity.
48
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-101 to -144 (Supp. 1974).
42. Section 12 of the Controlled Substance Act provides:
Every practitioner licensed by law to administer, dispense or distribute con-
trolled substances shall, keep a record of all such substances administered, dis-
pensed or distributed ... [and] the name and address of the patient ....
Id. § 780-112(b).
43. Id. § 780-137(c).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1690.101-.115 (Supp. 1974).
45. Id. § 1690.103.
46. Id. § 1690.108(a).
47. Id. § 1690.104.
48. Section 4(e) of the Drug and Alcohol Act states:
Such statistics shall not reveal the identity of any patient or drug and alcohol
dependent person or other confidential information.
Id. § 1690.104(e).
Section 4(a) (8) provides additional protection:
Any information obtained through scientific investigation or research con-
ducted pursuant to this act shall be used in ways so that no name or identifying
characteristics of any person shall be divulged without the approval of the council
and the consent of the person concerned. Persons engaged in research pursuant
to this section shall protect the privacy of individuals who are the subject of such
research by withholding from all persons not connected with the conduct of
[VOL. 20
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Pursuant to this statute, the Governor's Council has proposed detailed
information regulations. 49 According to these proposed regulations, no
information collected by the state regarding an individual who, as a result
of drug abuse or dependence, is or has been the recipient of the services
of a treatment program can be disclosed to any person, agency, institution,
governmental unit, or law enforcement personnel, subject to nine excep-
tions designed to obtain for the client benefits due him.50 The expressed
such research the names or other identifying characteristics of the individuals.
Id. § 1690.104 (a) (8).
Section 8 contains the restrictions upon the use of patients' records:
(b) All patient records . . . prepared or obtained pursuant to this act, and
all information contained therein, shall remain confidential, and may be disclosed
only with the patient's consent and only (i) to medical personnel exclusively for
purposes of diagnosis and treatment of the patient or (ii) to government or other
officials exclusively for the purpose of obtaining benefits due the patient as a
result of his drug or alcohol abuse or drug or alcohol dependence except that in
emergency medical situations where the patient's life is in immediate jeopardy,
patient records may be released without the patient's consent to proper medical
authorities solely for the purpose of providing medical treatment to the patient.
Disclosure may be made for purposes unrelated to such treatment or benefits only
upon order of a court of common pleas after application showing good cause
therefor. In determining whether there is good cause for disclosure, the court
shall weigh the need for information sought to be disclosed against the possible
harm of disclosure to the person to whom such information pertains, the physician-
patient relationship, and to the treatment services, and may condition disclosure
of the information upon any appropriate safeguards. No such records or informa-
tion may be used to initiate or substantiate criminal charges against a patient
under any circumstances.
(c) All patient records and all information contained therein relating to drug
or alcohol abuse or drug or alcohol dependence prepared or obtained by a private
practitioner, hospital, clinic, drug rehabilitation or drug treatment center shall
remain confidential and may be disclosed only with the patient's consent and
only (i) to medical personnel exclusively for purposes of diagnosis and treatment
of the patient or (ii) to government or other officials exclusively for the pur-
pose of obtaining benefits due the patient as a result of his drug or alcohol abuse
or drug or alcohol dependence except that in emergency medical situation where
the patient's life is in immediate jeopardy, patient records may be released with-
out the patient's consent to proper medical authorities solely for the purpose of
providing medical treatment to the patient.
Id. § 1690.108(b), (c). Section 8 is almost identical to the confidentiality provisions
of the Federal Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (Supp.
III, 1973). Hence, the analysis of the federal act (see notes 77-119 and accom-
panying text infra), should apply to the Pennsylvania provisions.
49. 4 PA. BULL. §§ 290.1 et seq. at 2488-90 (Dec. 7, 1974).
50. Id. § 290.4a. The exceptions are that information can be disclosed: 1) to a
judge who has imposed sentence upon a particular client when enrollment in a treat-
ment program is a condition of the sentence, 2) to the client's probation or parole
officer where treatment is a condition of probation or parole, 3) to judges who have
assigned a client to a treatment program under a presentence, conditional release
program, 4) by client application to a judge for assistance in deciding whether to
initiate conditional release status for the client, with the client's written consent, 5)
to the client's attorney in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, 6) to em-
ployers or prospective employers who seek to further client rehabilitation or who
seek to employ treatment clients, 7) to an insurance company, health or hospital plan
which has contracted with the client to provide medical benefits, 8) to governmental
officials to obtain.for the client government benefits, and 9) to a licensed physician
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purpose of the proposed information regulations is "to insure the confi-
dentiality of client-oriented data."51 To effectuate this purpose, the Gov-
ernor's Council is prohibited from entering the client's name or other
identifying information upon any list or into any data processing system. 
2
If adopted, these proposed regulations, coupled with existing statutory
provisions, would do a great deal to protect the anonymity of the addict
enrolled in a treatment program in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, as a genus,
reporting and recordkeeping statutes are considered a threat to confiden-
tiality and anonymity.
53
B. Centralized Record Systems
Centralized nationalized recordkeeping systems also represent a threat
to confidentiality.5 4 The major recordkeeping system relating to drug
addicts in this country is the Client Oriented Data Acquisition Process
(CODAP), a data processing system developed in late 1971 partly to
standardize the reporting requirements of several federal agencies.,5
CODAP was not established under any federal law or regulation; instead,
it was implemented through contracts negotiated between the federal and
state governments.50 The system was primarily designed to determine the
nature and extent of the national problem of drug abuse, so that methods
of attacking the problem could be devised.57
51. Id. § 290.5.
52. Id. § 290.6.
53. McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1594-96.
54. Id. at 1595. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COM-
PUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS (1971). See also A. WEST, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967).
One commentator lists five ways centralized data banks threaten privacy:
the invader can 1) utilize one source which has collected and collated the informa-
tion, 2) update his data quickly with precision, 3) keep track of a certain individual
despite the person's mobility, 4) have access to a whole range of historical informa-
tion about the individual, and 5) detect and interpret potentially self-revealing private
information. Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual
Freedom and the Right to Privacy, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 270, 273-74 (1964).
55. PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON DRUG ABUSE, MEMORANDUM ON
CODAP (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review) [hereinafter cited as CODAP
MEMORANDUM]. The six agencies whose reporting requirements were involved were
the National Institute of Mental Health, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the
Veterans' Administration, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and
Housing and Urban Development. Id. at 2.
56. For example, on July 9, 1973, the city of Boston received a notice of a grant
award for almost $2 million from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH).
The grant was subject to three conditions: 1) that the applicant document a demon-
strated need for the program to be funded by the federal grant; 2) that the grantee
participate in CODAP; 3) that the grantee submit an implementation plan approved
by the state drug abuse coordinator, the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Pre-
vention (SAODAP), and NIMH. Letter from Boston Mayor Kevin H. White to
Dr. Bertram Brown, Aug. 7, 1973.
57. Zimmerman, Patients' Right to Privacy Violated Claim Critics of New U.S.
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Based upon the findings of a pilot test,58 CODAP was modified and
divided into two major components, National Management (NM) and
Client Management (CM) in order to meet the two objectives of "develop-
ment of a standardized Federal reporting procedure on client related data,
and establishment of minimum standards of information essential to making
treatment decisions for individual drug abusers."5 9 The CM component
"establishes standards for the acquisition and use of client related data to
support the decision-making needs of those directly involved in providing
treatment and rehabilitation services."60 It was to become effective upon
January 1, 1973 ;61 however, it is not known at present whether it was
ever instituted.62 In any event, the NM component proved to be un-
acceptable to several of the states.
Under the NM component, quarterly reports of admission and case
sample information, census information, and funding information must
be made by any drug treatment facilities receiving federal funds. The
stated purpose of these reports was to "support the decision-making needs
of Federal agencies with respect to performance, planning and follow-up
in the area of treatment and rehabilitation."6 3
NM became effective nationally in April, 1973, and sought to answer,
through data collection, the following questions: Is treatment capacity
adequate? What types of clients are in treatment? What modalities
4
reflect favorable discharge rates? How are "involuntary" clients respond-
ing? What are the most frequent client disposition patterns in each
modality? What are the rates of opiate and nonopiate abuse among dif-
ferent client groups? Is the present drug abuse pattern changing?65
One portion of the project posed an enormous threat to addict
anonymity - the unique identifier aspect of the information requested
from the treatment centers. Each center was obliged to fill out a form for
each client admitted to the program, and required to supply the following
information: 1) the client identifier number of 10 digits ;66 2) the client's
birth data; 3) the client's zip code; 4) the client's race; 5) the first two
initials of the given and maiden name of the client's mother.6 7 The pro-
58. CODAP was pilot tested in 28 treatment programs in 1971. CODAP
MEMORANDUM, supra note 55, at 1.
59. Id.
60. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, CODAP CLIENT MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 1-1 (May, 1973) (on file at the Villanova Law Review).
61. Id.
62. Secrecy has surrounded CODAP. Consequently, information could not be
obtained concerning whether CM had ever been implemented.
63. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE CODAP NATIONAL MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK (October, 1973) (on file at the Villanova Law Review).
64. "Modality" is the term used to designate the type of treatment used. For a
brief description of the various types of treatments, see notes 6-8 supra.
65. Zimmerman, supra note 57, at 1, col. 3.
66. Id. at 2, col. 2. These numbers are coded in such a way that they could not
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ponents of CODAP said that this information was necessary to protect
the integrity of the statistical survey that could be compiled from the
CODAP forms because there was no other way to be certain that treatment
program enrollees would be counted only once. 68
In recognition of the grave danger to confidentiality, several states
opposed the rendition of the information required by the unique identifier.
The Attorney General of Pennsylvania, in an opinion letter to the Gov-
ernor's Council, stated that participation in CODAP would violate certain
provisions of the Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Act, specifically sections
4(a) (8), 4(e), and 8(b). 69 On the basis of this interpretation, the Gov-
ernor's Council threatened to refuse to enter the contract for the federal
funds.
70
Pennsylvania was joined in its opposition to the unique identifiers in
CODAP by Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health viewed reporting the requested information as a violation of the
duty imposed upon a physician by the physician-patient relationship. In
addition, the Department feared that CODAP was an initial step in the
subordination of individual privacy and freedom through the use of cen-
tralized data systems and computer banks which would ultimately lead to
the development of a method of identifying individuals who possessed
certain personality or character traits deemed by some to be undesirable.
This, in turn could lead to social and political repression.
7 1
Dr. Matthew Dumont, the Assistant Commissioner for Drug Rehabili-
tation in Massachusetts Department of Mental Health illustrated the dan-
gers inherent in CODAP's unique identifier.72 Assuming that the over-
whelming majority of persons in drug treatment programs in Massachusetts
were born in that state, he asserted that by the interested agency's going
to the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, and mechanically sorting the data
cards, individuals enrolled in treatment centers could be identified through
the use of CODAP information. The sorting would be performed, seriatim,
by year of birth, month of birth, day of birth, sex, and race. The selected
cards could then be hand sorted for the first two letters of the mother's
maiden and given name. Dr. Dumont contended that on a national level,
68. Id.
69. Letter from Israel Packel to Dr. Richard Horman, May 3, 1973 (copy on
file at the Villanova Law Review). For the text of these sections, see note 48 supra.
On June 7, 1973, however, the Attorney General, after conferring with SAODAP
and being guaranteed that "the Federal Government has no practical means of using
the code ...to discover the identity of its subject from [the] data . . " informed
Dr. Horman that participation in CODAP would not violate state law. Letter from
Israel Packel to Dr. Richard Horman, June 7, 1973 (copy on file at the Villanova
Law Review).
70. Zimmerman, U.S. Data Collecting System Challenged, The Toronto journal,
Dec. 1, 1973, .at 3, col. 1 (on file at the Villanova Law Review).
71. Dumont, C.O.D.A.P.: THE MONSTER MASQUERADING As A WINDMILL 2-4
(undated and unpublished; copy on file at the Villanova Lawv Review).
72. Dumont, POSITION PAPER ON CLIENT ORIENTED DATA AcQUSITION PROCESS 1
(undated and unpublished; copy on file at the Villanova Law Review). *
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given the patient's zip code, any individual or agency with access to social
security or internal revenue files could follow this sorting procedure and
accomplish the same identification with minimal effort and at minimal
cost.
7 3
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts remained adamant in their opposition
to CODAP and finally were permitted by SAODAP and the National
Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) to leave blank the unique identifier
portions of the reports. As a result, current CODAP forms no longer
request the uniquely identifying information. 74  Thus, it appears that
CODAP itself does not pose the threat to addict anonymity that it once
did. Nevertheless, because of the nature of these data compilations, cen-
tralized recordkeeping systems do threaten addict anonymity.
7 5
III. FEDERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS WHICH
PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY
Two federal statutes, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act ,of 1970 (1970 Act) 76 and the Drug Abuse Office and Treat-
ment Act of 1972 (1972 Act),77 govern the confidentiality of records
relating to drug addicts enrolled in methadone treatment programs. The
1970 Act was designed to regulate the importation, quality, sale, and use
of controlled substances. The 1972 Act, however, was enacted to
focus the comprehensive resources of the Federal Government and
bring them to bear on drug abuse with the immediate objective of
significantly reducing the incidence of drug abuse in the United
States within the shortest possible period. of time, and to develop a
73. Id.
74. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, CODAP NATIONAL MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 3-2, 4-2 (Nov. 1974) (on file at the Villanova Law Review).
75. Another centralized drug recordkeeping system that is currently operating
is the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). Project DAWN, established by
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is designed to identify patterns of
drug abuse in selected metropolitan areas. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
DAWN HANDBOOK 1 (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review). Phase I of the
program began in April, 1973, when DEA contracted with a private corporation to
obtain drug abuse and drug death statistics. Id. at 2. Data was to be gathered from
five sources: 1) inpatient units of nonfederal, short-term general hospitals; 2)
emergency departments in nonfederal, short-term general hospitals; 3) county medical
examiners or coroners; 4) student health centers; and 5) crisis intervention centers
not directly affiliated with colleges and universities. Id. at 2-3. Data collection was
carried out in each participating facility by individuals who completed one form for
each drug abuse incident or death occurring during the reporting period. Phase II
began in March, 1974, with the objectives of providing data for the assessment of
the relative health hazards and abuse potential for substances in current use, and of
providing data helpful to SAODAP for planning purposes. Id. at 12. The original
DAWN forms for hospital inpatient facilities contained blocks for the initials of
the maiden name of the patient's mother, but current forms, not contained in the
DAWN handbook, do not request information that could uniquely identify the patient.
76. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
77. Id. §§ 1101 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973)
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comprehensive, coordinated long-term Federal strategy to combat drug
abuse.
78
Of the two, the 1972 Act contains the more detailed provisions upon
confidentiality.79 For any patient, it protects the confidentiality of records of
identity, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment which are maintained in
connection with the performing of any drug abuse function under the
1972 Act, subject to the following exceptions: 1) the patient can consent
to a release of the records to medical personnel in order to receive diagnosis
or treatment or to governmental personnel in order to receive benefits;
2) the records can be released without patient consent to medical personnel
to meet a bona fide medical emergency, or to qualified medical personnel
for research purposes so long as individual patients are not identified;
3) contents of the records must be disclosed upon court order after a
showing of good cause. In determining whether good cause is present,
a court must balance the need for the information against the possible
harm of disclosure to the client, to the physician-patient relationship, and
to the treatment services. 80 The 1972 Act continues by providing that other
than as specified, no such record may be used to initiate or substantiate
any criminal charge against a patient or to conduct investigations of a
patient.8' SAODAP has promulgated detailed regulations for administer-
ing the 1972 Act.82 Under the regulations, as precautions against breach
of confidentiality SAODAP suggests that the records be marked "Con-
fidential" and locked in cabinets marked with the warning:
CONFIDENTIAL PATIENT INFORMATION
Any unauthorized disclosure is a Federal offense.
83
The remainder of the regulations implement the provisions of the statute.
Arguably the 1972 Act and existing regulations represent an earnest
attempt to provide limited protection to anonymity. Unfortunately, there
are four basic flaws in the legislative scheme.8 4 First, the protective pro-
78. Id. § 1102.
79. Id. § 1175.
80. Id. § 1175(b) (2) (C).
81. Id. § 1175(c).
82. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1401.01 et seq. (1974). These regulations formerly existed as
21 C.F.R. § 401.01 et seq. (1973).
83. 21 C.F.R. § 1401.05 (1974).
84. McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1602-03, consider that the applicability
of the statute and regulations only to federal programs that require a federal license
is a deficiency. This flaw, however, is more apparent than real. The confidentiality
provisions of the 1972 Act apply to all records of identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or
treatment in connection with any drug abuse prevention function assisted under the
1972 Act. 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (Supp. III, 1973). "Drug abuse prevention function"
includes any program or activity relating to drug abuse education, training, treat-
ment, rehabilitation, or research. Id. § 1103(b). Therefore, application of the 1972
Act is not actually confined to federal programs requiring a federal license as
McNamara and Starr asserted.
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visions apply only to written records; no attempt is made to protect
against disclosure of oral communications.8 5 Second, no procedural safe-
guards are provided to the patient if his records are made available to law
enforcement agents by court order. Thus, a court can issue such a directive
after an ex parte proceeding upon a showing of good cause for disclosure,
with the affected client or treatment program given no opportunity to show
that good cause did not exist.8 6 Third, enforcement of the rules is through
criminal sanction. 7 However, since effective enforcement of the statute
in general requires detection and prosecution, law enforcement officials
may find themselves in something of a dilemma. In seeking to obtain con-
fidential information which may be needed for detection or prosecution,
these officials also have a duty to protect confidentiality. As a result, there
is at least some reason to doubt that the provisions prohibiting disclosure
will be effectively enforced. To remedy this posssible deficiency, the statute
should contain a provision for private enforcement. 8 The fourth flaw of
the statute exists in that there is no unequivocal imposition of a duty upon
all persons not to disclose and not to obtain or attempt to obtain disclosures.
A clear statement of this duty, if coupled with a provision for private
enforcement, would greatly increase the probabilities that disclosures would
not occur.
In an effort to provide better protection against disclosure, SAODAP
has proposed new regulations.8 9 First, the suggested security precaution
is to be mandatory.90 Second, the proposed regulations prohibit infiltration
into treatment programs by undercover agents.91 In addition, the pro-
posals contain a provision proscribing implicit disclosure, by forbidding
those in possession of such information from revealing whether a described
person is not or had not been a recipient of treatment.9 2 Furthermore, the
proposals specifically provide that when disclosure is prohibited by either
state or federal law, disclosure is not permitted.93 The proposed regulations
would also remedy the problem of a lack of procedural safeguards to dis-
closure. Under proposed section 1401.63(c) (2), there is a requirement
that the patient be notified of any application for a court order to compel
85. McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1609.
86. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 1175(b) (2) (C) (Supp. III, 1973).
87. McNamara & Starr, supra note 1, at 1610. The 1972 Act provides that one
disclosing information in violation of the law shall be fined not more than $500 for
the first offense and not more than $5,000 for each subsequent offense. 21 U.S.C.
§ 1175(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
88. It is arguable, however, that the federal statutes can be the basis for the
inference of a private right of action. See Section IV A infra.
89. Proposed HEW Reg. §§ 1401.01 et seq., 39 Fed. Reg. 30429 (1974).
90. Proposed HEW Reg. § 1401.06.
91. Id. § 1401.08.
92. Id. § 1401.11.
93. Id. § 1401.15.
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disclosure. The patient is given an opportunity to appear and be heard
and has the right to be represented by counsel. 94
The proposed regulations, however, do not provide complete protection.
The major deficiency appears in proposed section 1401.63,95 covering the
investigation and prosecution of patients, which permits a court to authorize
disclosure of patient records for purposes of investigating or prosecuting
a violent crime which the patient is alleged to have committed, if the
court is satisfied that certain conditions evincing a high public interest are
met. 96
This proposal, which has no counterpart in the existing regulations, is
both confusing and self-defeating. If the purpose of confidentiality is to
encourage enrollment in voluntary treatment programs and client co-
operation in all such programs, anonymity must be protected. Yet these
provisions assume that the patient's identity is known. The proposed
regulation would permit disclosure of a patient's records when it has been
alleged that he has committed a crime.97 Hence, a request for such records
could only be made if it were known that the suspect was a participant in a
treatment program. As a result, it would appear that anonymity is not
protected because at least identification of the client can be compelled
without satisfying the criteria in the proposed regulation. This, then, does
nothing to further the goal and purpose of confidentiality. Moreover, if
enrollment is to be encouraged, the addict must be assured that his par-
ticipation in a program cannot lead to disclosure of information to law
enforcement officials or any other group which data would not be available
were the addict not enrolled in the program. Permitting disclosure of
treatment records, even if made only after strict criteria are met, makes
such assurances impossible. Therefore, in this respect, the proposed
regulations fall short of the desired goal.
94. Id. § 1401.63(c) (2).
95. Id. § 1401.63.
96. The regulation would provide that a
[C]ourt may authorize disclosure of records pertaining to a patient for the pur-
pose of conducting an investigation of or a prosecution for a crime which the
patient is alleged to have committed only if the court finds that all of the follow-
ing criteria are met:
(1) There is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the patient
committed the crime.
(2) The crime involved kidnapping, homicide, assault with a deadly weapon,
rape, or other acts causing or directly threatening loss of life or serious
bodily injury.
(3) There is a reasonable likelihood that the records in question will dis-
close material information or evidence of substantial value in connection with the
investigation or prosecution.
(4) There is no other practicable way of obtaining the information or evidence.
(5) The actual or potential injury to physician-patient relationship in the
program affected and in other programs similarly situated, and the actual potential
harm to the ability of such programs to attract and retain patients is outweighed
by the public interest in authorizing the disclosure sought.
Id.
97. Id. 17
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In contrast to the relatively detailed provisions on confidentiality"
contained in the 1972 Act, section 502 of the 1970 Act merely states:
The Attorney General may authorize persons engaged in research to
withhold the names and other identifying characteristics of persons
who are the subjects of such research. Persons who obtain this au-
thorization may not be compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil,
criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding to identify
the subjects of research for which such authorization was obtained. 98
Workers in methadone treatment centers are among those considered "per-
sons engaged in research," and clients are considered research subjects. 0
Reading the 1970 Act and the 1972 Act together raises the obvious
question of how a directive from the Attorney General prohibiting dis-
closure under the 1970 Act effects an attempt to obtain patient records
through a court order under the 1972 Act. This issue was litigated in
People v. Newman.100 In that case, the police, through a subpoena duces
tecum, tried to compel Dr. Newman, a methadone treatment center director,
to disclose pictures of treatment clients' 01 so that the witness to a killing
could identify the assailant, whom she believed was a participant with her
in Dr. Newman's treatment program. Dr. Newman refused to release the
pictures, arguing that as a result of instructions from the Attorney General,
the 1970 Act prevented him from doing so. 10 2 The district attorney con-
tended that the 1972 Act applied and that under it a director of a methadone
maintenance program could be compelled under court order to produce
records. Thus, the issue, as framed by the court, was "whether the 1972
98. 21 U.S.C. § 872(c) (1970). The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) has the same powers that Section 502 gives to the Attorney General. 42
U.S.C. § 242(a) (1970).
99. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(2), 872(a) (1970).
In an amicus curiae brief filed in People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 380, 298
N.E.2d 651, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974), HEW and
SAODAP noted:
Methadone Maintenance Treatment Programs are "the most important drug
addiction research programs presently in existence" and that their "long range
success depends on the ability of each program director to promise each participant
unconditionally, that his participation in the program will not be disclosed" ....
Id. at 388, 298 N.E.2d at 656, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 508 (emphasis added).
100. 32 N.Y.2d 380, 298 N.E.2d 651, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1163 (1974). The Newman decision is also important with regard to the use
of the physician-patient evidentiary privilege. See notes 152-60 and accompanying
text infra.
101. Photographs of each client were taken upon his or her admission to the
program. Staff members were to check the photographs before dispensing methadone
to ensure that only enrollees received the drug and that each client received the proper
dosage. 32 N.Y.2d at 381, 298 N.E.2d at 653, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
102. Id. at 382-83, 298 N.E.2d at 653, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The Attorney General
of the United States, pursuant to section 502 of the 1970 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 872(c)
(1970), had sent a letter to Dr. Newman authorizing the doctor to withhold the
names and other identifying information about research subjects. The letter read
in part: "You may not be compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal,
administrative, legislative or other proceeding to identify the subjects of such re-
search." 32 N.Y.2d at 386 n.5, 298 N.E.2d at 655 n.5, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 507 n.5.
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Act repealed the 1970 Act insofar as the confidentiality of a patient's record
is concerned. 10 3 The New York Court of Appeals held that the 1970
Act retained vitality and controlled to prohibit disclosure. 0 4 Accordingly,
the court reversed the holding below that Dr. Newman was in contempt
of court for failure to comply with the subpoena. 105
The Court of Appeals based its decision upon four factors. First, pur-
suant to the 1970 Act, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, even after the 1972 Act took effect, had exercised
the power to authorize persons engaged in drug research to withhold
information identifying their clients. 106 Apparently, in the court's opinion
this indicated that those charged with administering the 1970 Act inter-
preted the 1972 Act as complementing rather than superseding the 1970
Act. Second, the court focused upon the language of a regulation, promul-
gated under the 1972 Act, which stated:
Nothing in either the language or the legislative history of the [1972]
Act indicates any intent on the part of Congress to amend the [confi-
dentiality] provisions of the 1970 Act or to reduce the protection
which can be afforded under them.10 7
Third, the court noted the difference between the scope of each of the
acts. According to the Newman court, the 1970 Act was designed
to help ensure the success of drug research programs in which addict
participants require anonymity. . . .A similar guaranty was not ...
necessary in the 1972 Act because that statute covered a wide range
of programs and activities in which absolute confidentiality was not
required as a prerequisite to successful operation of the programs. 08
Under this view of the purpose of the respective Acts, the court reasoned
that the 1972 Act provisions on confidentiality did not authorize disclosure
when disclosure was prohibited under the 1970 Act. When, however, the
1970 Act did not apply, because the program involved was not a drug
research program, the confidentiality provisions of the 1972 Act governed
to provide some, albeit not absolute, protection against disclosure.10 9 The
final factor relied upon by the court was the established rule of construction
that "unless there is clear legislative design to repeal or modify an earlier
piece of legislation ...we must if at all possible, give full effect to both
103. 32 N.Y.2d at 384, 298 N.E.2d at 654, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
104. Id. at 389, 298 N.E.2d at 657, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
105. Id. at 390, 298 N.E.2d at 657, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
106. Id. at 386-87, 298 N.E.2d at 655, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 507, citing 37 Fed. Reg.
24639 (1972).
107. 32 N.Y.2d at 387, 298 N.E.2d at 655, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 507, citing 37 Fed.
Reg. 24639 (1972).
108. Id. at 387, 298 N.E.2d 655-56, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 508. The court used drug
abuse educational programs and job training programs for medical aides as examples
of the types of programs covered by the 1972 Act which did not require confiden-
tiality. Id.
109. Id. 19
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statutes." 110 Finding no such evidence in the 1972 Act, the court stated
that no repeal could be implied."'
One important issue regarding the relationship between the two acts
was not resolved in Newman - whether a research program that would
fit within the scope of both acts could utilize the protection afforded by
the 1972 Act; that is, can the 1972 Act be used to protect confidentiality
when the 1970 Act would be ineffective in doing so? The importance of
this issue can be illustrated through a hypothetical situation based upon
the Newman facts. Suppose that New York police officers went to Dr.
Newman and asked him to disclose the identities of treatment clients so
that the clients might be protected from being approached by drug dealers
who might seek to entice the clients to leave the program and renew their
heroin use. This scheme would both protect clients and aid the police in
identifying drug dealers. Suppose further that Dr. Newman thought that
this was a good idea and wanted to disclose the information. Under the
1970 Act, he would be permitted to disclose, 112 .but according to the 1972
Act, such disclosure would violate the law.113 This situation illustrates
the important differences between the 1970 and 1972 Acts. Under the
1970 Act only compulsory disclosure is prohibited ;114 that is, the police
in the hypothetical situation could not lawfully force Dr. Newman to reveal
the clients' names. Voluntary disclosure, however, is prohibited by the
1972 Act.115 Moreover, the former operates to prohibit compulsory dis-
closures only in formal proceedings. 116 Thus, in the hypothetical situation,
the 1970 Act could not prohibit compelled disclosure to the police so long
as the information were not used in a proceeding. Under the 1972 Act,
however, no disclosure, voluntary or compulsory, could be made, regardless
of whether or not the information were to be used in a proceeding, subject,
of course, to the exceptions set out in the 1972 Act itself. 17 Therefore,
circumstances could exist that would make use of the 1972 Act protections
preferable to use of those in the 1970 Act.
Upon this particular issue, Newman is susceptible to two interpreta-
tions. The first is that when a 1970 Act program is involved only the
1970 Act safeguards apply, thereby precluding a 1970 Act program from
utilizing 1972 Act protections. This interpretation is supported by the
110. Id. at 389, 298 N.E.2d at 657, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
111. Id.
112. This is so because the 1970 Act empowers the Attorney General to authorize
merely the withholding of information. The Act confers no power upon the Attorney
General to prohibit disclosure. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 872(c) (1970). See text accompanying
note 98 supra.
113. The 1972 Act prohibits disclosure subject to stated exceptions. 21 U.S.C.
§ 1175(a) (Supp. III, 1973). See notes 79-83 and accompanying text supra.
114. 21 U.S.C. § 872(c) (1970).
115. Id. § 1175 (a), (c) (Supp. III, 1973).
116. Id. § 872(c) (1970).
117. Id. § 1175 (Supp. iii, 1973).
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differences between the scope of the 1970 and the 1972 Acts.118 If each
applies to a different program and serves a different purpose, the argument
can be made that no one program can utilize the protection of both acts.
The second interpretation is that the two acts complement each other:
if confidentiality is protected by either act, disclosure is prohibited. This
latter view is the more cogent, because of the basic philosophy behind both
acts, that of fostering a medical solution to the drug abuse problem by
encouraging addicts to seek and cooperate with treatment methods.119
Treatment is encouraged by protecting confidentiality and anonymity.
Therefore, if the program fits within the coverage of the act, that particular
act can be used to protect anonymity, regardless of whether the other act
would fail to offer such protection. As a result, both acts would accomplish
their intended purposes much more effectively.
IV. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF AN ADDICT'S PERSONAL RIGHT
TO CONFIDENTIALITY
Having outlined the primary threats to addict anonymity and con-
fidentiality, and the apparent inadequacy of those statutes and regulations
designed to meet this problem, it is clear that some additional safeguards
are necessary. One effective method might be to give the addict the right
to protect his anonymity and confidentiality of records by resorting to the
judicial system. The remainder of this Comment will briefly discuss five
legal theories upon which such a right could be premised. None of these
theories has been judicially approved, but each of them can be derived
from presently accepted legal concepts.
A. Implied Cause of Action for Statutory Violations
An individual within the class intended to be protected by a statute
may, at times, have a right to enforce the statute in a civil action, despite
the absence of an express statutory provision for private enforcement. 12
118. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
120. See Comment, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The
Judicial Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REV.
413 (1972), for a discussion of private enforcement of consumer fraud statutes.
The concept that a cause of action could be inferred from a federal regulatory
statute was first approved by the Supreme Court in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33 (1916), in which the Court stated that the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 27
Stat. 531 (1893), implied the right to recover damages by one sustaining a loss
occasioned by violation of the act, if the individual was a member of the class "for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted . . . ." 241 U.S. at 39. See Comment,
Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285,
285-86 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Civil Remedies] for a discussion of other regula-
tory laws under which a civil remedy has been implied.
Note that two remedies could be inferred from a regulatory law in the addict-
confidentiality context: a cause of action for damages for improper disclosure or a
right to sue to enjoin improper disclosure.
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Theoretically, the inference of a civil remedy from a regulatory statute
can be justified in one of two ways. One view is that the statute establishes
a standard of conduct, breach of which is actionable if the action resulted
in an injury to one whom the statute was intended to protect.121 The other
is that the statute prohibits certain conduct, and if one acts in contravention
of the statute, the court will act as lawmaker and create a new cause of
action in favor of the injured party.122 Perhaps the most compelling argu-
ments in favor of recognizing a civil remedy are in the words of one
commentator:
[I] mplying a cause of action may increase the likelihood of compliance
with the statute by giving victims incentive to assist in its enforcement
and potential violators, faced with an additional penalty, added reason
to conform their conduct to it. The implied cause of action can also
provide direct relief for members of a class that the legislature wished
to protect. 128
To determine whether a remedy should be inferred requires an
analysis of the relationship between the provisions of the statute involved
and the goal of the lawmakers in enacting it. Such a right of action could
be found to be implicit in a state statute, such as section 8 of the Pennsyl-
vania Drug and Alcohol Act which mandates confidentiality, 124 or in a
federal statute. For example, section 408(e) of the 1972 Act provides
for the confidentiality of the records of clients and imposes fines if these
provisions are violated.125 The purpose of the confidentiality provisions
can be gleaned from their legislative history. One aim of the 1972 Act
was to combat drug abuse through medical methods, and the assurance
of confidentiality was viewed as a necessity in meeting this goal.'26  As
121. See Civil Remedies, supra note 120, at 286.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 291. Victims of a violation of the confidentiality provisions of a drug
act would not need an incentive to assist in enforcement, but they would need a method
enabling them to assist in enforcement.
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.108 (Supp. 1972). See note 48 supra.
125. Section 408(e) provides:
Except as authorized under subsection (b) of this section, any person who
discloses the contents of any record referred to in subsection (a) of this section
shall be fined not more than $500 in the case of a first offense, and not more than
$5,000 in the case of each subsequent offense.
21 U.S.C. § 1175(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
126. The House-Senate conferees stated:
The conferees wish to stress their conviction that the strictest adherence to
the provisions of this section [on confidentiality] is absolutely essential to the
success of all drug abuse prevention programs. Every patient and former patient
must be assured that his right to privacy will be protected. Without that assur-
ance, fear of public disclosure of drug abuse or of records that will attach for
life will discourage thousands from seeking the treatment they must have if this
tragic national problem is to be overcome.
Every person having control over or access to patients' records must under-
stand that disclosure is permitted only under the circumstances and conditions
set forth in this section. Records are not to be made available to investigators
COMMENTS
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noted previously in this Comment, 2 7 due to the fact that the confidentiality
provisions are enforced through criminal sanctions, law enforcement offi-
cers face a possible conflict of interest in investigating and prosecuting
drug-related crimes and insuring compliance with the 1972 Act. Conse-
quently, an addict willing to enroll in a treatment program cannot be
guaranteed that these confidentiality provisions will be vigorously en-
forced. As a result, there can be no guarantee that enrollment in the
program will not create a source of information about the addict that would,
otherwise be unavailable. To rectify this, an individual who is wronged
as a result of a violation of the confidentiality provisions should have the
right to enforce the statute through a civil action against the wrongdoer.
With knowledge that such protection exists, an addict would be more
willing to undergo treatment.
A recent example of a judicial creation of a private right of action
from a federal regulatory statute is Stewart v. Travelers Corp.28 where
the Ninth Circuit held that the penal provision of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act,129 which imposes penalties upon the employer in the event
of the discharge of an employee due to garnishment of wages for his
indebtedness, implied a cause of action in favor of an employee so dis-
charged. 130 The court stated that absent "a clear congressional intent to
the contrary, the courts are free to fashion appropriate civil remedies,
based on the violation of a penal statute where necessary to ensure the
full effectiveness of the congressional purpose.' 3 ' The Stewart court relied
in part upon Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States. 32 In that case the
Supreme Court had declared that where the interest the plaintiff asserts
is within the class that the statute was intended to protect, the harm alleged
is within the type the statute was intended to prevent, and the statutory
criminal penalties are inadequate to fully protect the asserted interest, a
civil action for damages arises by implication.133
It is submitted that applying the Wyandotte standards to the situation
of an addict whose right to confidentiality has been violated would result
in the recognition in the addict of a civil remedy. The confidentiality pro-
visions were intended to protect addicts and the harm to be prevented was
disclosure of information. Regarding the question of the adequacy of the
for the purpose of law enforcement or for any other private or public purpose or
in any manner not specified in this section.
H.R. REP. No. 920, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1972).
127. See notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
128. 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
129. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1674 (1974).
130. 503 F.2d at 109.
131. Id. at 110, quoting Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Avicion, 433 F.2d 1031,
1033 (9th Cir. 1970).
132. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
133. Id. at 202. In Wyandotte, the Court held that the remedies for violation of
section 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970), which
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remedies expressly provided for in the statute, the Stewart court said
that the question is whether the statute's protection might be enhanced by
allowing private civil relief.134 Here, priviate civil relief would enhance
the statute's effectiveness by compensating the addict for his injury, thereby
encouraging compliance with the confidentiality provisions. Hence, treat-
ment programs could give addicts assurances that their rights to confiden-
tiality will not be violated. An additional consideration is that the existing
statutory penalty would in no way compensate the addict for the violation
of his right."35 Thus, a civil remedy should be implied. 136
B. Privileged Communications
The privileged communications theory, upon which an addict could
base an argument that he has a right to prohibit disclosure of information
about himself, springs from a physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient,
psychologist-patient, or social worker-client privilege.1 7 A brief analysis
of these privileges as they exist in California, Massachusetts, New York,
and Pennsylvania may be helpful in revealing how the privileges operate as
background for a discussion of the protection they can afford confidentiality.
1. California
California makes privileged a communication between a physician or
psychotherapist and a patient,"38 which gives the patient, physician, or
134. 503 F.2d at 112.
135. Violators of the confidentiality provisions of the 1972 Act face mandatory
fines of not more than $500 for the first offense and not more than $5000 for each
subsequent offense. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
136. The Supreme Court recently refused to infer a private cause of action for
a violation of section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). Cort v. Ash, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975). Although
Ash may indicate a reluctance on the part of the Court to infer a cause of action
for violations of federal statutes, it did not preclude the possibility of these actions.
The Ash Court noted that private causes of action have been inferred where there
was "a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff
class and the defendant class in a particular regard." Id. at 2090. For additional
discussion upon the issue of the implication of civil remedies from federal statutes,
see the cases and materials cited in 503 F.2d at 109-10 nn.3-6, and Note, 20 VILL. L.
REv. 615 (1975).
137. Whitford, The Physician, The Law, and The Drug Abuser, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 933 (1971). Whitford argues for the adoption of such a privilege to protect
drug users in order to foster a medical solution to the problem of drug abuse. Id.
at 938. Note that the Federal Rules of Evidence contain no provision for a general
physician-patient privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
138. A "confidential communication between patient and physician" includes:
information obtained by an examination of the patient, transmitted between a
patient and his physician in the course of that relationship and in confidence by
means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the patient in
the consultation, or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which 24
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psychotherapist the right to refuse to disclose of such a communication.13.9
The term "psychotherapist" includes psychiatrist, psychologist, and clinical
social workers.'
40
Although the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient provisions
would appear to protect the anonymity of an addict enrolled in a treatment
program and to preserve the confidentiality of information communicated
to the program staff, they in fact offer only limited protection because the
privilege is deemed not to exist in criminal proceedings.'41 Because the
real value of the privilege to the addict exists in the criminal proceeding, the
addict is thus denied the benefit of this privilege in the situation in which
it would be most useful. Moreover, there is no privilege as to information
which must be reported to a public employee.142 Therefore, under Cali-
fornia's statute which requires treatment programs to inform state officials
of the names of patients, 43 no physician-patient privilege would exist.
2. Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, the relevant provisions for privileged communica-
tions are not so elaborate. While Massachusetts provides for no general
physician-patient privilege, a psychotherapist-patient privilege does exist.
44
A psychotherapist is a licensed physician who devotes a substantial portion
of his time to the practice of psychiatry.145 Privileged communications
include matters of diagnosis and treatment, and the privilege can be asserted
the physician is consulted, and includes a diagnosis made and the advice given
by the physician in the course of that relationship.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 992 (West Supp. 1974). The definition relevant to the psycho-
therapist-patient relationship is identical, except that "psychotherapist" is used instead
of "physician." Id. § 1012.
139. Id. § 994 (physician-patient); id. § 1014 (psychotherapist-patient).
140. "Psychotherapist" is defined as:
(a) A person authorized, or reasonably believed by the patient to be authorized,
to practice medicine in any state or nation who devotes, or is reasonably
believed by the patient to devote, a substantial portion of his time to the
practice of psychiatry;
(b) A person licensed as a psychologist under . . . the Business and Profes-
sions Code;
(c) A person licensed as a clinical social worker under . . . the Business and
Professions Code, when he is engaged in applied psychotherapy of a non-
medical nature.
Id. § 1010 (emphasis added). Under these provisions and those relating to social
workers, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 9041, 9042, 9049, 9052, 9054, 9056 (West Supp.
1974), it is likely that most treatment programs will have a "psychotherapist" work-
ing in or at least consulting with the program.
141. CAL. EVID. CODE § 998 (West 1966) (physician-patient); id. § 1028 (West
Supp. 1974) (psychotherapist-patient).
142. Id. § 1006 (West 1966) (physician-patient); id. § 1026 (psychotherapist-
patient).
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11221 (West Supp. 1974). See note 19 supra.
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in "any court proceeding and in any proceeding preliminary thereto and in
legislative and administrative proceedings .... 146
3. New York
In New York, communications between physician-patient, 147 psychol-
ogist-patient, 14 social worker-client 49 may be privileged. The physician-
patient privilege provides:
Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to prac-
tice medicine, . . . nursing or dentistry shall not be allowed to disclose
any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a pro-
fessional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity. 150
The privilege is testimonial and operates in all proceedings in which an
individual may be compelled to testify under oath.' 5 '
This particular provision was interpreted in People v. Newman,'
52
where the Court of Appeals of New York held, in addition to what was
the proper interpretation of the federal acts,153 that the physician-patient
privilege did not apply to preclude disclosure of pictures upon the program
records of methadone treatment clients. 15 4 The court reasoned that under
the statute, only information "acquired in attending a patient in a pro-
fessional capacity" was privileged. 55 The photographs, the court stated,
were obtained by Dr. Newman's staff during administrative admission pro-
cedures. 156 The court also relied upon New York case law which had
established that facts about a patient which may be plainly observed or
easily obtained by a layman were not privileged. 157 Because the patient's
physical appearance fit this exception, the privilege could not prevent
disclosure. 58
The Newman decision can be criticized because it is contrary to the
national policy of promoting a medical solution to the problem of drug
abuse. 59 In the treatment context, it is the identity of the client which
146. Id.
147. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
148. Id. § 4507.
149. Id. § 4508.
150. Id. § 4504(a).
151. Id.
152. 32 N.Y.2d 397, 298 N.E.2d 651, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1163 (1974).
153. See notes 110 & 111 and accompanying text supra.
154. 32 N.Y.2d at 398-99, 298 N.E.2d at 653-54, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 383, 298 N.E.2d at 653, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
157. Id., citing, e.g., Klein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 221 N.Y. 449, 117 N.E. 942
(1917).
158. 32 N.Y.2d at 398-99, 298 N.E.2d at 653-54, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04. The
contempt judgment was reversed upon other grounds. See notes 103-08 and accom-
panying text supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
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must remain confidential if enrollment is to be encouraged. Thus, the
confidential communication consists of the client's identity; to label this
communication mere administrative information not privileged under the
law is to defeat the purpose of making the privilege theory available to
the client. 160
In any event, the apparently destructive effect of Newman upon con-
fidentiality may be mitigated if the decision is limited to its facts. In
Newman the photographs were to be shown only to the witness to the
killing, so that she could identify the assailant. Because the witness had
recognized the assailant as one of the people enrolled in her own treatment
program, to allow her to view the photographs merely to discover his name
would in no way imperil the anonymity of treatment clients. Furthermore,
disclosure was sought not to identify the client as a drug addict, but to
identify him as a suspected murderer. Since there is a great public interest
in identifying and apprehending murderers, it can be argued that Newman
merely stands for the proposition that the overriding public interest in
identifying and apprehending murderers justified the disclosure. Thus, it
is possible that in New York, the physician-patient privilege survives in
the context of addict-patient confidentiality even after Newman.
Newman concerned only the statute regarding the physician-patient
privilege. The privilege in other relationships is governed by other stat-
utes. If the treatment center employs or is directed by a registered psy-
chologist, or if the addict consults a registered psychologist, the addict
client effectively can claim the benefit of the attorney-client privilege, be-
cause New York law places the psychologist-client privilege upon the same
footing as the attorney-client privilege.1 61 Use of the attorney-client priv-
ilege would be particularly helpful to an addict wishing to preserve his
anonymity, since the client's identity can be privileged against disclosure. 16 2
With respect to communications between an addict and social worker, the
statute states that if the treatment program employs or is directed by,
160. McNamara and Starr, supra note 1, at 1600.
161. The law provides:
The confidential relations and communications between a [registered] psy-
chologist . . . and his client are placed on the same basis as those provided by
law between attorney and client, and nothing in such article shall be construed
to require any such privileged communications to be disclosed.
N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
162. See Tierney v. Flower, 32 App. Div. 2d 392, 302 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1969), in
which a child's natural mother sought to compel the attorney who had represented
the child's adoptive parents in the adoption arrangements to disclose the names and
addresses of his clients. The court compelled disclosure but stated that when dis-
closure of identity is sought the public interest must be weighed against the injury
that would be done to the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 395, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
In Tierney, concern for the child's welfare outweighed the slight damage that would
be done to the attorney-client relationship. In a psychologist-patient context, the public
benefit would have to be weighed against the very strong interest in allowing a
drug addict to continue to have the confidence in his psychologist necessary to a
medical solution to the addiction problem.
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or if the addict otherwise consults one who is, a certified social worker,
163
the communication is privileged, although not in the same sense as a
communication between attorney and client.
16 4
4. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania law is similar. If the treatment center employs or is
directed by, -or if the addict otherwise consultsj a li'censed psychologist, the
addict-client can claim a privilege equal to the attorney-client privilege.
165
The advantage of using the. attorney-client privilege is more uncertain in
Pennsylvania than in New York, however, in that no case has discussed
whether the identity of the client can be privileged against disclosure.
5. Summary
Given the law of privileged communications, it remains to be seen
how the privilege theory can be useful in protecting an addict. Unlike a
civil remedy inferred from .a regulatory statute, the privileged communi-
cations theory can be used as a shield but not as a sword. The privilege
is largely testimonial, and may be invoked only in .a judicial proceeding of
some type. While the protection thus offered is limited, it is not without
value. One benefit is that the physician treating .a.:drug-addicted or drug-
dependent person may feel less reluctant to assure an addict that no
information will be disclosed and more confident about refusing to disclose
the, information to one requesting it than he otherwise would be, thereby
denying to present or prospective employers and law enforcement officers
a source of information that could imperil the patient's employment or
community position. Moreover, assuming tliat law enforcement officers
do obtain information with which to commence harassing prosecutions, the
information obtained from a physician, psychotherapist, psychologist, or
social worker would not be admissible if the privilege applies in criminal
proceedings. Therefore, the privileged communications theory might be one
source of protection for an addict.' 66
163. N.Y. EDUc. LAW §§ 7702-04 (McKinney 1974), provides a definition of a
certified social worker.
164. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1213 (Supp. 1974). The provisions about the
attorney-client privilege state:
Nor shall counsel be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communi-
cations made to him by his client, or the client be compelled to disclose the same,
unless in either case this privilege be waived upon the trial by the client.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 686 (1964) (criminal proceedings) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 321 (1958) (civil proceedings).
166. Whitford, supra note 119, at 943. 28




Arguably, an addict enrolled in a drug treatment program can premise
a right to anonymity upon a general right to privacy. The argument can
take one or two forms: first, testimonial disclosure violates the addict's
constitutional right to privacy; second, any unauthorized disclosure is
an invasion of privacy, giving the addict a cause of action in tort.
1. Constitutional Right to Privacy
The modern theories 167 about the existence of a constitutional right
to privacy are primarily based upon two cases: Griswold v. Connecticut,'"8
and Roe v. Wade.169 In Griswold, the Supreme Court of the United States
held invalid, as an unconstitutional invasion of a married person's privacy,
a Connecticut statute which made criminal the use of contraceptives.
70
The Court declared that the Constitution created zones of privacy which
included the first amendment right to privacy in association, 171 the third
amendment right to refuse to quarter soldiers in peacetime, the fourth amend-
ment right to be "secure, in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures," the fifth amendment right to
refuse to testify against oneself, and a possible ninth amendment right to
privacy which is retained by an individual because it is not elsewhere
limited in the Constitutioh.1
72
In Roe, the Court held, inter alia, that the constitutional right to
privacy encompassed a woman's right to decide, until a certain time in her
pregnancy, whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The Roe Court
recognized the right to privacy as fundamental and stated that it was in
167. The right to privacy as known in the United States dates to 1890. Warren &
Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). Recently, different
commentators have described the right in various ways. It has been stated that
[c]onfidentiality . . . refers to one person's duty not to reveal information
about another person without the person's consent. The second person has a
correlative right to insist that this information not be disclosed.
The individual employee's right to privacy of his personal information is
invaded twice in the process of collecting and keeping personnel data: [in col-
lection and in dissemination].
Mironi, The Confidentiality of Personal Records: A Legal and Ethical View, 25
LAB. L.J. 270, 271-72 (1974). Another commentator has stated that
the essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than the freedom of the
individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which,
and most importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and
opinions are to be shared with or withheld from others.
Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Com-
puter, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 837, 868 (1971), quoting Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and
Behavioral Research, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1965).
168. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
169. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
170. 381 U.S. at 485.
171. Id. at 483 citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
172. 381 U.S. at 484.
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part based upon the fourteenth amendment concepts of personal liberty
and restriction upon state action.173 Because the Roe Court stated merely
that the right to privacy extended to activities relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,
174
the first question in determining whether the right can be utilized by a
treatment program client is whether this concept can be extended to en-
compass a right to keep medical records confidential and a right to protect
anonymity. An argument for extension is that drug abuse treatment relates
to an addict and his body as intimately and personally as termination of a
pregnancy relates to a woman and her body.
One pre-Roe decision suggests that such an extension cannot be made.
In Felber v. Foote,175 a federal district court addressed the issue of whether
a constitutional right to privacy protected a psychiatrist against having to
disclose the identity of a drug dependent, deciding that no such right existed
to protect against invasions of the physican-patient relationship. 17 The
plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of a
state statute which compelled "practitioners of the healing arts" to name
and report other information about drug dependent persons to the state.177
According to the statute, the information in the reports would not be
admissible in judicial proceedings, the information was to remain confiden-
tial, and it would not be used for any purpose other than rehabilitation,
statistical analysis, or medical treatment.17 8 The plaintiff premised his suit
upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871,179 claiming that the reporting statute
represented an unconstitutional deprivation of the physician's right to
privacy. First, the plaintiff argued that the statute interfered with his
private practice in three ways: 1) by imposing a duty to disclose, the
statute created a conflict with his professional duty to his patient to keep
communications confidential; 2) because he would be forced to report any
information requested or reveal the duty to disclose to his patients before
offering treatment, his patients might choose to decline treatment; and 3)
173. 410 U.S. at 153. If privacy were viewed as a fundamental right, restrictive
state legislation- could only be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 155.
174. Id. at 152-53.
175. 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970).
176. Id. at 90.
177. The statute provides:
Each practitioner of the healing arts shall report to the commissioner of health
the full name, address and date of birth of every person who, in his opinion is a
drug-dependent person dependent upon controlled drugs. . . . Practitioners mak-
ing such reports in good faith shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability
that otherwise might be incurred from the making of such report. No such report
or the information therein shall be admissible in any criminal prosecution or used
for other than rehabilitation, statistical or medical purposes and each such report
shall be held confidential by the commissioner.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-48a (1969).
178. Id.
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the statute might require licensed physicians to violate standards of pro-
fessional ethics.1 8 0 The plaintiff's second contention was that the unique
nature of the doctor-patient relationship afforded a physician a "constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy in his conduct of [the doctor-patient]
relationship."' 81 The court rejected all these arguments, quoted Katz v.
United States,8 2 wherein the Supreme Court stated that "there is no gen-
eral constitutional right to privacy,"'18 and reasoned that the concept of
privacy propounded by the plaintiff was not analogous to any zone of
privacy which had previously been granted constitutional protection.
184
With respect to the Griswold decision, the Felber court stated that in
protecting "the sanctity of the family," the Court had not indicated an
intention "to constitutionalize the privacy of other relationships, specifically
that of physician and patient."'
18 5
Although the Felber court faced only a psychiatrist's claim of a right
to privacy, it would appear that the court would have reached the same
result had a prospective patient brought the same action, especially in light
of the court's statement concerning the privacy of the physician-patient rela-
tionship. However, the validity of Felber may be in question in light of
Roe. Drug abuse treatment could be considered such a personal matter
that, under Roe, there is a constitutional right against the state intrusion
into this matter which a reporting statute would entail.
The Felber situation should be contrasted to that in Merriken v.
Cressman.8 6 In Merriken, a Pennsylvania district court held that a drug
abuse prevention program designed to aid a school district in identifying
potential drug abusers violated the right to privacy of parents with children
enrolled in that school district. 8 7 The program required high school stu-
dents to answer questions which were "highly personal" and went "directly
to an individual's family relationships and his rearing."' 88  The court
stated that it would look closely at any challenged factual situation that
involved family relationships and child rearing. The plaintiff's successful
argument was based upon Griswold and Roe. The factual setting in
Merriken involved family relationships and child rearing; therefore, Gris-
wold and Roe provided protection. But it also involved drug abuse pre-
180. 321 F. Supp. at 87.
181. Id. at 88.
182. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
183. Id. at 350.
184. 321 F. Supp. at 88.
185. Id. at 88-89.
186. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
187. Id. at 922.
188. Id. at 918. The questionnaires asked about family religion, the race or skin
color of the student, and the family composition, including the reason for the absence
of one or both parents. The questionnaires also delved into such details of family
relationships as whether one or both parents hugged and kissed the child when the
child was small, or told the child how much they loved him, or enjoyed talking about
current events with the child, or made the child feel unloved. Id. at 918.
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vention. Although Merriken can be read as an extension of the zone of
privacy doctrine into the drug abuse area, it is readily distinguishable from
the Felber situation because the information sought in furtherance of the
drug abuse prevention program conflicted with the confidentiality of a
parent-child relationship and not that of physician-patient.
2. Tort Action for Invasion of Privacy
An addict in a treatment program may have a cause of action in tort
for invasion of privacy against anyone who disclosed information that
revealed his status as an addict. At common law, the cause of action for
invasion of privacy exists in four contexts: 1) where another appropriates
one's name or likeness for personal advantage; 2) where another intrudes
upon one's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 3) where another
publicly discloses embarrassing facts about one's private life; and 4) where
another creates publicity that places one in a false light in the public
eye.189 Essential to the cause of action are two elements. The prying or
intrusion must be one that would be offensive or objectionable to a reason-
able person and it must be into an area that is deemed to be private.' 90
In the present context, disclosure of the identity of or informtaion
about a treatment client arguably could be a disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about that person, 191 in that the disclosure, while not a
physical prying or intrusion, would be an unauthorized encroachment into
a very private area. However, an addict may have difficulty in proving
that the information has been published, another necessary element.'
92
Evidently, at one time, formal publication in writing to more than just
a small group was required for the action to be successful, but the reason
for this rule seems to have been that of preventing individuals who had not
been damaged from recovering for invasions of privacy. 193 That the un-
authorized disclosure would itself satisfy the publication requirement is
probable so long as it results in injury to the addict. 9 4 Unfortunately, an
189. Mironi, supra note 167, at 281. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383,
389 (1960).
190. Prosser, supra note 189, at 390-91.
191. Note, Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom, 36 U.
CIN. L. REv. 103, 107 (1967). The author of the Note argues for judicial recognition
of a cause of action for breach of confidence to protect against improper disclosure
of medical information.
192. Prosser, supra note 189, at 393.
193. Id. at 393-94.
194. The tentative draft of the Restatement of Torts, Second, takes a different
view of this issue. It states:
One who gives publicity to matters concerning the private life of another, of a
kind highly offensive to a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of privacy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). Comment b
thereto distinguishes publication, which includes any communication to a third person, 32
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addict asserting a tort action for invasion of privacy for an unauthorized
disclosure would have almost no precedent upon which to rely.
One case, Home v. Pattdn,195 does offer support for this theory. In
Horne, the defendant-physician released information about the plaintiff to
the plaintiff's employer, who subsequently discharged the plaintiff.1 9" The
court held that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the portion
of the complaint in which the plaintiff alleged a cause of action for invasion
of privacy, 197 stating:
Unauthorized disclosure of intimate details of a patient's health
may amount to unwarranted publication of one's private affairs with
which the public has no legitimate concern such as to cause outrage,
mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensi-
bilities.
198
Nothing would appear to preclude application of this reasoning for the
benefit of an addict patient suing his physician for invasion of privacy
where the physician had disclosed the patient's identity or status as an
addict to a person who had no legitimate concern for the information.'99
Another difficulty that might be encountered in asserting this cause
of action is the existence of a statutory exemption from liability for a
physician who discloses such information. Indeed, a statute like that dis-
cussed in the Felber case 200 would totally preclude recovery. In spite of
these pitfalls, a cause of action in tort for disclosure of confidential infor-
mation does have validity, at least conceptually. At present, the inadequacy
of common law concepts of privacy has prompted the suggestion that there
be "recognition of a fifth class within this tort, a class which could be
called 'breach of confidence,'" based upon the Hippocratic oath.
20'
from publicity, which takes place when the matter is made public by communication
of it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded
as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. Id., comment b.
195. 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973). See notes 208-13 and accompanying
text infra.
196. 291 Ala. at 709-10, 287 So. 2d at 830-31. The court did not indicate what
this information was.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 709, 287 So. 2d at 830.
199. There are a number of cases other than Horne in which courts have recog-
nized a cause of action for invasion of privacy resulting from disclosure of medical
information where the information revealed was rather unique. See, e.g., Barber
v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (revelation of patient's capacity
for food) ; Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920) (public release
of a film of patient's caesarian section operation) ; Griffin v. Medical Soc'y of New
York, 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1939) (publication of photographs of
patient's "saddle nose").
200. See note 177 supra.
201. Note, supra note 191, at 109. This note contains an excellent history of the
right to privacy as it relates to disclosure of medical information. Id. at 107-13.
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D. Malpractice (Breach of Fiduciary Relationship)
The argument has been made that the oath taken by physicians is
sufficient to protect an addict's anonymity, because, by taking the Hippo-
cratic oath,20 2 the practitioner vows to keep information communicated in
the physician-patient relationship absolutely secret.2 0 3 The requirement of
secrecy would be viewed as part of the physician's professional duty and
breach of that duty would give rise to a malpractice claim by the patient.
20 4
Alternatively, because physicians take the oath, clients have a reasonable
expectation that their communications and indeed their identities will be
treated by the physician as confidential. This, then, induces the client to
place trust in the physician, and the relationship assumes the characteristics
of a fiduciary relationship.2 0 5 As a result, disclosure would give the patient
202. The Hippocratic oath read as follows:
I swear by Apollo, the physician, and Aesculapius and Hygeia and Panacea
and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judgment, I
will keep this oath and this stipulation .... Whatever I see or hear in the life
of men, whether in connection with my professional practice, or not, that ought
not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge; considering that all such knowl-
edge should be kept secret.
Quoted in Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 CoLUm. L. Rxv. 388, 395-96 (1906).
The modern version of the oath reads as follows:
Whatever in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection
with it, I see or hear, in the life of man, which ought not be spoken of abroad, I
will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.
Quoted in Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (1973).
203. Note, supra note 191, at 109. The argument could also be based upon a state's
professional code. In California, for example, the Business and Professional Code
provides that "willfully betraying a professional secret constitutes unprofessional
conduct." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2379 (West 1974). Section 2960(g), which is
applicable to psychologists, provides that "willful, unauthorized communication of in-
formation received in professional confidence" makes the psychologist subject to dis-
ciplinary action. Id. § 2960(g). Indeed, the American Medical Association Code of
Ethics states:
A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients,
unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to
protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957), quoted
in Note, supra note 191, at 104 n.11.
204. The requirement of secrecy could also be considered an implied term in a
contract between the addict and physician. See Note, supra note 191, at 104. This
view would not ordinarily be applicable to treatment relationships, because usually
there is no "employment contract." If, however, the treatment program is private
with the client paying for services, an employment contract would exist and a term
requiring secrecy could be implied. This would give the client a contract action were
the physician to disclose the information. See Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D.&C.
543 (Phila. County C.P. 1940). In Clayman, a physician took photographs of a
patient showing facial disfigurement resulting from the patient's illness. The court
dismissed preliminary objections to the bill in equity to enjoin the physician from
developing or using the film, negatives, or prints of the photographs. See also DeWitt,
Medical Ethics and the Law: The Conflict between Dual Allegiances, 5 W. REs. L.
REv. 5, 20-23 (1953).
205. Indeed, the physician-patient relationship has been described as fiduciary.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Knight, 25 Pa. D.&C.2d 649, 655 (Phila. County C.P. 1961),
aff'd, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962). See also Boyle, Medical Confidence - 34
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an action for breach of the physician's fiduciary duty. These arguments
were subtly implied in Felber. The plaintiff claimed that the statute might
require licensed physicians to violate professional standards of conduct.20 6
This contention was rejected because the "Hippocratic oath has been
analyzed as no vow of absolute secrecy, but rather as imposing a general
obligation on the physician to abstain from gossip. '20 7 The Felber court
said nothing more about the plaintiff's argument, completely ignoring the
fact that the Hippocratic oath has also been interpreted as requiring
secrecy.
20 s
In contrast, the Horne court held that the confidential nature of the
physician-patient relationship imposed a duty upon the physician not to
disclose medical information. 20 9 According to the court, imposition of this
duty was required by the state public policy that "information obtained by
a physician in the course of a doctor-patient relationship be maintained
in confidence unless public interest or the private interest of the patient
demand[ed] otherwise." 210 This public policy was derived from three
sources: the state professional code ;211 the Hippocratic oath;212 and the
American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics.213
Civil Liability for Breach, 24 No. IRE. L.Q. 19 (1973), wherein the author, in dis-
cussing British law, analyzes whether liability for disclosure could be based upon a
breach of duty arising from the doctor's confidential relationship to his patient and
concludes affirmatively. Id. at 38-39. Boyle decided that the three elements necessary
to the imposition of such liability - that the information be of a confidential nature,
that it be communicated in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and
that there be an unauthorized use of the information - would all be present if a
physician made an unauthorized disclosure of information regarding a patient. Id.
at 26-28.
206. 331 F. Supp. at 87.
207. Id. at 87 n.5, citing Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L. REv. 388
(1906). Purrington interpreted the oath as follows:
Here is no vow of absolute secrecy; not even a limitation of duty to patients.
It is a general obligation that the physician will abstain from gossip and observe
a decent regard for the privacy of all men, not saying what in his judgment were
better left unsaid.
6 COLtM. L. REV. at 395-96.
208. Note, supra note 191, at 109.
209. 291 Ala. at 708-09, 287 So. 2d at 829-30. The court also held that the
physician breached the implied contract between physician and patient that the physician
would keep all personal information confidential. Id. at 709-10, 711, 287 So. 2d at
830-31, 832.
210. Id. at 708, 287 So. 2d at 829.
211. 10 ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 257(21) (14) (Cum. Supp. 1973). This section provides:
The state licensing board for the healing arts shall have the power and it is its
duty to suspend for a specified time to be determined in the discretion of the
board, or revoke any license to practice the healing arts of any branch thereof
in the state of Alabama whenever the licensee shall be found guilty of any of the
following acts or offenses; . . . (14) Wilful betrayal of a professional secret.
212. See note 201 supra.
213. See note 202 supra.
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The Horne court's analysis214 would seem to provide an addict with
a remedy of damages if his physician made an unauthorized disclosure of
his condition to an employer. However, such a remedy would possibly
not exist for disclosures mandated by reporting statutes or perhaps those
made voluntary to law enforcement officials because of the public interest
in disclosure.
E. Conversion
The final legal theory upon which an addict may arguably base a
right to confidentiality is a conversion theory. At the root of this approach
is the view that a person's identity and personal information can be con-
sidered his personal property. The individual would "own" this infor-
mation. Because of this ownership, the individual would have the right
to use the information as he wishes, either to disclose or refuse to disclose
the information, or to grant permission to disclose or to withhold such
permission. Consequently, use or disclosure of the information without the
owner's authorization would be a conversion, giving the owner a tort
remedy against a wrongdoer. 215 One author recognized the need for such
a concept of property when he stated:
[P]ersonal information ... should be defined as a property right, with
all the restraints on interference by public or private authorities and
due-process guarantees that our law of property has been so skillful
in devising.216
Under this view, not only would the addict have a conversion action if
his property - his personal information - were interfered with, but also
all the requirements of procedural and substantive due process would have
to be met if there were any governmental interference with the right.
217
This approach is novel and currently has no support in case law. Never-
theless, if intangible property can be converted,218 and if personal infor-
mation can be considered property, the argument that unauthorized dis-
closure is a conversion would appear to be meritorious.
214. As the Home court noted, several jurisdictions have reached the same result
by basing the duty upon a testimonial privilege statute. 291 Ala. at 706, 287 So. 2d
at 837. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Clark
v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Berry v. Moench,
8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P.
572 (1917).
215. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 79-97 (1971).
216. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324-25 (1967).
217. See generally Landynski, Due Process and the Concept of Ordered Liberty:
"A Screen of Words Expressing Will in the Service of Desire"t 2 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1 (1974).
218. See Comment, A New Found Holiday: the Conversion of Intangible Property,
1972 UTAH L. REV. 511, wherein the author argues that there is no reason to preclude
conversion actions for intangible property.
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A serious drug abuse problem exists in this country. There has been
a congressional determination that the problem is to be attacked at the
level of the individual through medical methods. For a medical attack
upon the problem to be successful, voluntary enrollment in treatment pro-
grams and active cooperation by addicts in mandatory treatment programs
must be encouraged. Such encouragement cannot be effective if addicts
believe that entrance into the program will merely create another source
of information about them that can be used to their detriment by law
enforcement officers, employers, or any other individual or group in society.
Therefore, it is essential that addicts be guaranteed that their anonymity
and the confidentiality of their medical records will be preserved. At present,
the law does not allow such assurances. But the present laws need be
extended only slightly to permit such assurances. Federal statutes, state
statutes, evidentiary privileges, constitutional concepts of privacy, and
common law notions of tort could be utilized to construct for the addict a
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